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WHAT ARE WE SEARCHING FOR?: CONDITIONS, 
ELEMENTS, AND REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID 
“SEARCHING INQUIRY” IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
 
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 
People v. Crampe1 
(decided Oct. 13, 2011) 
 
There is a long historical struggle between the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel and a criminal defendant‘s right to self-
representation.  Although not explicitly written, the right of a crimi-
nal defendant to represent himself has deep roots in common law and 
has been found by the United States Supreme Court to be implied by 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.2  The tension 
between these two cornerstones of criminal procedure requires both a 
balance between a criminal defendant‘s option to waive his right to 
counsel, and the court‘s responsibility to make him aware of the con-
sequences and dangers of proceeding without the assistance of an at-
torney.  These warnings by the court are often referred to as a 
―searching inquiry,‖3 indicating that the court must make an inquiry 
into the defendant‘s ability to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelli-
gent waiver of his or her right to counsel.4  There is no rigid formula 
to this colloquy, and states are free to codify requirements in statutory 
schemes, but basic information must be given to the defendant and 
the inquiry must be made at every critical stage of a criminal pro-
ceeding.5 
In People v. Crampe, a consolidated opinion, the New York 
Court of Appeals considered what constitutes a ―searching inquiry‖ 
 
1 957 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). 
3 People v. Providence, 813 N.E.2d 632, 634 (N.Y. 2004). 
4 People v. Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1991). 
5 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92-94 (2004). 
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and when such an inquiry should be made.6  In Crampe, the court 
held that a town justice did not make the defendant aware of the dis-
advantages of self-representation, resulting in an insufficient ―search-
ing inquiry,‖ and ordered a new trial.7  In People v. Wingate, the 
court held that a sufficient colloquy was held by the trial judge, but 
because the inquiry must be made at every critical stage of a criminal 
proceeding, the trial judge‘s warnings could not ―retrospectively 
[cure] the suppression court‘s‖ deficient searching inquiry and there-
fore a new suppression hearing was ordered.8  These decisions were a 
product of federal principles of the United States Supreme Court and 
Constitution, as well as the common law of New York and the New 
York State Constitution.9 
I. CRAMPE 
The defendant, Alexander Crampe, was arrested and charged 
with criminal possession of the controlled substance phencyclidine, 
commonly known as PCE.10  Crampe appeared at the Justice Court 
without an attorney, and when he was asked by the town justice if he 
intended to proceed pro se, he answered ―I guess[ ] so, your Hon-
or.‖11  The judge handed Crampe a pretrial order and reviewed the 
document with the defendant by reading it aloud to him.12  The order 
described some basic rights, including the defendant‘s right to coun-
sel, and the apparent drawbacks of proceeding without an attorney.13  
Crampe signed the order and the case was adjourned.14  As the defen-
dant left the court the judge said, ―[b]e here with a lawyer or without 
a lawyer, as you choose.  I advise you to get a lawyer, sir.‖15  Crampe 
did not follow the judge‘s advice; he was convicted and sentenced to 
six months in jail.16 
 
6 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 256-57. 
7 Id. at 263, 265. 
8 Id. at 263-65. 
9 Id. at 257, 262. 
10 Id. at 257. 




15 Id. at 257-58. 
16 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 258. 
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The defendant appealed, claiming that the warning given by 
the town justice was insufficient and did not make him fully aware of 
the consequences of continuing without counsel.17  The Appellate 
Term affirmed the lower court‘s decision, stating that the ―Justice 
Court adequately warned defendant of the importance of legal repre-
sentation and the risks associated with proceeding pro se.‖18  The 
court also stated that due to the ―defendant‘s prior arrest and convic-
tion record [he was] not unfamiliar with the operation of the criminal 
justice system.‖19 
The Court of Appeals ultimately overturned the Appellate 
Term‘s holding and found that the town justice did not make a suffi-
cient inquiry.20  The judge did not warn the defendant of the ―draw-
backs of self-representation before allowing [him] to go [pro se].‖21  
The basic form that was read to Crampe stated that ―proceeding pro 
se brought with it the danger of conviction—a risk that also exists 
when the accused is represented by counsel—and that criminal trials 
and proceedings are complicated.‖22  This did not give Crampe the 
full knowledge that he needed to make a valid waiver.23 
II. WINGATE 
The defendant, Blake Wingate, was arrested for criminal pos-
session of stolen property and a controlled substance.24  The police 
found Wingate in a stolen van with a crack pipe in his possession.25  
After the appointment of two different attorneys who Wingate be-
lieved did not have his best interests in mind, the defendant requested 
to represent himself with an attorney available to assist him.26  When 
the judge explained to Wingate ―that he was not entitled to hybrid re-





20 Id. at 263. 
21 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 263. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 258. 
25 Id. 
26 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 258. 
27 Id. 
3
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The judge had a brief conversation with Wingate, inquiring about the 
defendant‘s understanding of the penalties he faced and the limits of 
self-representation.28  After affirming his understanding, the judge al-
lowed Wingate to represent himself at the hearings.29  The suppres-
sion hearing was held in front of a judicial hearing officer who rec-
ommended that Wingate‘s ―motion to suppress the physical evidence 
(the crack pipe) and statements made to police‖ should be denied and 
―referred the case back to Supreme Court for determination.‖30  ―The 
Supreme Court adopted the hearing officers findings‖ and denied 
Wingate‘s motion.31 
The case continued to trial where the trial judge independent-
ly explored Wingate‘s wishes to represent himself.32  The judge made 
an in-depth inquiry into the defendant‘s knowledge of the charges 
and sentence that he faced.33  After reviewing that the defendant had 
rejected a plea bargain of one and one half to three years in prison, 
the judge strongly urged Wingate to reconsider obtaining an attorney, 
stating it was his: 
good faith belief that it is a mistake to represent your-
self.  Areas of law can be complicated and a person, 
not even another lawyer [should] engage in self-
representation.  So I strongly urge you to get a lawyer, 
and if you cannot afford one, a lawyer will be ap-
pointed for you.  That is my honest heartfelt belief.  
Because of the exposure that you may be facing in 
terms of incarceration, should you lose and the intrica-
cies involved in self-representation and legal matters, 
you should seriously get a lawyer to represent you.34 
Wingate confirmed that he understood what the judge had ex-
pressed and the judge reiterated that it was against the defendant‘s 
best interest to continue without a lawyer due to the period of incar-




30 Id. at 258-59. 
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versation with the defendant by asking him about his educational 
background and his experience in the legal field;36 Wingate had a 
two-year college education and worked various jobs including pe-
riods as a paralegal and a law librarian.37  Along with his experience 
in the legal field, the defendant explained that he had been studying 
law for the last ten or twelve years.38  The judge vehemently ex-
pressed that the defendant should obtain a lawyer, but Wingate, indi-
cating that he had considered the matter, insisted on self-
representation because he was not willing to give up control to an at-
torney.39  The judge finally said there was ―[n]o reason for any fur-
ther explanation,‖ and had an attorney on standby to assist Wingate.40 
After all the warnings and probing of the defendant‘s under-
standing, the judge went further, asking Wingate if he had ―sufficient 
time to reflect on [his] decision to represent [him]self‖ to which he 
answered ―[y]es.‖41  Inquiring about the defendant‘s knowledge of 
the legal system and its procedures, the judge specifically wished to 
know whether Wingate had any familiarity with the rules of evi-
dence.42  There was little doubt that the defendant had minimal know-
ledge of the basic rules.43  In the judge‘s last attempt to convey the 
risk of self-representation, he told Wingate that ―almost all pro se re-
presentations are unsuccessful . . . that he would be held to the same 
legal standards as an attorney; [and] that he would ‗receive no advan-
tage or assistance from [the] court‘ . . . .‖44  With the defendant‘s last 
affirmations that he understood all that was explained to him, the 
judge was satisfied that he had asked all the ―relevant questions to de-
termine if [Wingate understood] the consequence[s] and the pitfalls 
of self-representation.‖45 
After trial, the jury found Wingate guilty on both counts and 
sentenced him to ―2 to 4 years on the stolen property charge, and one 
 
36 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 259. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 259-60. 
40 Id. at 260. 
41 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 260. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 261. 
45 Id. at 261-62. 
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year on the drug possession charge.‖46  The Appellate Division mod-
ified Wingate‘s conviction by vacating and dismissing the possession 
of stolen property count and affirming the drug possession charge.47  
The court acknowledged that the ―searching inquiry‖ made during the 
suppression hearing was not sufficient but ―the record as a whole 
demonstrate[d] that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent decision to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro 
se.‖48  Wingate was granted an appeal claiming that his waiver of 
counsel during the suppression hearing was not valid because there 
was an improper colloquy and the inquiry made by the trial judge 
could not retroactively validate earlier deficiencies.49 
The Court of Appeals held that the inquiry made by the sup-
pression court was deficient.50  Like the inquiry in Crampe, the sup-
pression court in Wingate did not adequately ―direct the defendant‘s 
attention to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation 
beyond the risk of a felony conviction.‖51  The court added that the 
trial court‘s extensive conversation with Wingate about the chal-
lenges he faced by proceeding pro se were sufficient to show that he 
made a valid decision to represent himself at trial.52  However, the 
court stated that this did not retrospectively solve the deficient in-
quiry at the suppression hearing because a valid waiver must be made 
at every stage of a criminal proceeding.53 
III. FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE: SELF-REPRESENTATION AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution gives 
a criminal defendant certain guaranteed rights, including the right to 
an attorney in criminal cases.54  Crampe turns on the issue of a crimi-
nal defendant‘s right to waive the right to counsel and proceed by 
 
46 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 262. 
47 Id. at 262. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 262-63. 
50 Id. at 263. 
51 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 263. 
52 Id. at 263-64. 
53 See id. at 264. 
54 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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self-representation.55  A valid waiver can only be made if it is done 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.56  There is a major conflict 
between a criminal defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
and his right to self-representation.  Determining whether a defendant 
has made a valid waiver is often a difficult decision for courts, which 
is the major cause of problems when dealing with the pro se issue.  A 
criminal defendant may suffer major consequences if convicted and 
proceeding pro se may increase that risk. 
A. Faretta v. California 
The right to self-representation is not found in the text of the 
United States Constitution and was not considered a guaranteed right 
until Faretta v. California.57  In Faretta, the defendant was accused 
of grand theft, and at a pretrial hearing he requested to represent him-
self.58  After being warned of the risks of proceeding pro se, the judge 
granted his request.59  Before trial the judge reversed his decision, 
forced the defendant to have counsel represent him during trial, and 
would only allow Faretta to conduct his defense through the ap-
pointed lawyer from the public defender‘s office.60  The Supreme 
Court held that criminal defendants have the constitutional right to 
represent themselves and a state may not force a lawyer upon a de-
fendant who wishes to defend himself.61  It concluded that the right 
was implicitly found in the combination of the language of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and English 
common law.62 
The Court began its discussion by stating ―the right of self-
representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of 
our Nation.‖63  Before the Bill of Rights was proposed, Congress ex-
ecuted the Judiciary Act of 178964 and the statute provided, among 
 
55 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 256-57. 
56 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
57 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 807-08. 
60 Id. at 807-10. 
61 Id. at 836. 
62 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812-13, 817, 821. 
63 Id. at 812. 
64 Id. at 812-13. 
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other things, that ― ‗in all the courts of the United States, the parties 
may plead and manage their own cases personally or by the assis-
tance of such counsel.‘ ‖65  The Court believed this showed that the 
right to self-representation had a history in our nation and was in-
tended by the founders of our country to be a right given to the 
people.66  Further, the Court recognized that many states have codi-
fied the right in their own constitutions and that numerous state 
courts have ―expressed the view that the right is also supported by the 
Constitution of the United States.‖67 
Introducing its argument that the right of self-representation is 
implicitly held in the Sixth Amendment, the Court began with a dis-
cussion of Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann.68  Adams ―held 
that the Constitution did not force a lawyer upon a defendant.‖69  The 
Court in Adams suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
―implicitly embodies a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer‘s 
help.‖70  In other words, if a criminal defendant has the right to the 
assistance of counsel then he also has the right to the converse.  
Adams stated that ―an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent 
choice, and with the considered approval of the court . . . [may] 
waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel.‖71 
The Court in Faretta heavily relied on the reasoning given in 
the Second Circuit case of United States v. Plattner.72  In Plattner, 
the court held that implicit in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is the 
right of a criminal defendant to personally manage and conduct his 
own defense at trial.73  Faretta expanded on the idea that the rights 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment are particularly personal in nature 
and stated that ―[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that 
a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused per-
 
65 Id. at 813 (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
66 Id. at 813-14. 
67 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 813-14. 
68 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814. 
69 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814-15 (citing Adams, 317 U.S. at 279). 
70 Id. at 814 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279). 
71 Adams, 317 U.S. at 275. 
72 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817; 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). 
73 Plattner, 330 F.2d at 273-74.  The court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment right to 
the assistance of counsel was intended to support the rights of the accused and not to inter-
fere with the ―absolute and primary right to conduct one‘s own defense in propria persona.‖  
Id. at 274.  It is the right of the accused to present his own defense whether he has help from 
an attorney.  Id. 
8
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sonally the right to make his defense.‖74  The right to defend is given 
directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if 
the defense fails and although not explicitly stated in the Sixth 
Amendment ―the right to self-representation–to make one‘s own de-
fense personally–is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the 
Amendment.‖75  If a defendant has the right to personally defend 
himself and does not wish to have the help of counsel, then forcing an 
attorney ―violates the logic of the Amendment.‖76  ―In such a case, 
counsel is not an assistant, but a master, and the right to make a de-
fense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amend-
ment insists.‖77 
The holding in Faretta was a monumental decision and estab-
lished the essence of the issues involved in Crampe.  The finding that 
self-representation is a constitutional right was very important, but 
the decision in Iowa v. Tovar78 went to the heart of the issues in 
 
74 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 820. 
77 Id.  The majority‘s last major point in Faretta dealt with the historical nature of the 
right of self-representation.  Id. at 821.  The Court indicated that the right has been a long 
withstanding principle dating back to the early periods of British criminal jurisprudence.  
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, English common law 
required the accused to ―appear before the court in his own person and conduct his own 
cause in his own words.‖  Id. at 823.  A defendant was required to represent himself, without 
the assistance counsel, and although this is not proof of a right to self-representation, it is an 
indication that the principle has existed for centuries.  Id. at 823-24.  The Court also dis-
cussed the presence of the principle in the early American Colonies.  Id. at 826.  Under fear 
that appointed counsel was representing the best interest of the Crown and not the accused, 
many defendants chose to represent themselves.  Id. at 826-27.  These historical discussions 
were meant to give support to the notion that the founders of our Nation and framers of our 
Constitution wished to include the right of self-representation and not disturb its centuries of 
recognition.  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 828-29, 832.  In a strongly delivered dissenting opinion, 
Justice Burger argued that the majority‘s ―ultimate assertion that [the right of self-
representation] is tucked between the lines of the Sixth Amendment is contradicted by the 
Amendment‘s language and its consistent judicial interpretation.‖  Id. at 837 (Burger, J., dis-
senting).  The dissenters‘ main argument was that the right to self-representation is not found 
in the text of the Constitution and is incorrectly implied by the majority.  Id.  In Justice 
Blackmun‘s dissenting opinion, he refers to Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), stat-
ing that just because a defendant has ―the ability to waive a constitutional right does not or-
dinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.‖  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 
847 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Singer, 380 U.S. at 34-35).  A criminal defendant 
can waive a constitutional right, including the right to counsel, but the dissent argued that it 
does not follow that a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to not have the assis-
tance of counsel.  Id. 
78 541 U.S. 77 (2004). 
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Crampe. 
B. Iowa v. Tovar 
In Tovar, the Supreme Court considered what is constitution-
ally required by a trial court when a defendant wishes to waive his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.79  The defendant was convicted of 
operating while intoxicated (―OWI‖) and driving while licensed 
barred.80  This was Tovar‘s third conviction of OWI, which would re-
sult in a much heavier fine and lengthier jail sentence.81  On appeal 
Tovar argued that his first conviction in 1996 should not be used 
against him because he pleaded guilty without the assistance of coun-
sel and was not adequately warned about the risks of proceeding pro 
se.82  The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision 
but the Supreme Court of Iowa ―reversed and remanded for entry of 
judgment without consideration of Tovar‘s first OWI conviction.‖83 
The Supreme Court of Iowa stated that the risks of ―proceed-
ing pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dan-
gers of proceeding pro se at a jury trial‖ and therefore the colloquy 
between the judge and the defendant should include certain mandated 
warnings.84  The highest court in Iowa claimed that before accepting 
a guilty plea a trial judge must: 
(1) advise the defendant that ―waiving the assistance 
of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] 
risk that a viable defense will be overlooked‖; and (2) 
―admonis[h]‖ a defendant ―that by waiving his right to 
an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an 
independent opinion on whether, under that facts and 
applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty[.]‖85 
―The Iowa Supreme Court held that both [of these] warnings [were] 
essential to the knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amend-
 
79 Id. at 81. 
80 Id. at 85. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 86 (citing State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Iowa 2003)). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 81. 
10
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ment right to the assistance of counsel.‖86 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and 
―h[e]ld that neither warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment.‖87  
The Court further stated that the Constitution only requires that the 
―trial court inform[ ] the accused of the nature of the charges against 
him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range 
of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.‖88  
There is no rigid formula to the warnings that must be given to a 
criminal defendant when he wishes to waive his right to assistance of 
counsel.89  Moreover, the Court suggested that the warnings required 
by the Iowa court were more damaging to both the criminal defen-
dant and the justice system as a whole if they were mandatory.90  If 
the Iowa warnings were given to every criminal defendant, it might 
suggest that there is a legitimate defense or opportunity to plead to a 
lesser charge when that prospect does not exist.91  This false hope 
could result in delays of a plea, draining the resources of the State 
and the defendant himself.92 
A waiver of counsel is intelligent when the defendant ―knows 
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.‖93  The 
Court in Tovar reasoned that there is no formula or script to deter-
mine the defendant‘s intelligence when deciding to proceed without 
counsel.94  ―The information a defendant must possess in order to 
make an intelligent‖ decision to waive his or her constitutional right 
―will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defen-
dant‘s education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped na-
ture of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.‖95  The Court also 
indicated that the dialogue to determine a ―knowing and intelligent‖ 
waiver is different and less formal ―at earlier stages of the criminal 
process‖ than at trial.96 
 
86 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
87 Id. 
88 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81. 
89 Id. at 88. 
90 Id. at 93. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Adams, 317 U.S. at 279. 
94 Tovar, 542 U.S. at 88. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 89 (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)). 
11
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The Tovar Court also discussed the Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Patterson v. Illinois,97 which found a ―pragmatic approach to the 
waiver question‖ and established that a less rigorous warning was re-
quired during the pretrial phase because ―the full dangers and disad-
vantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more ob-
vious to an accused than they are at trial.‖98  Following the reasoning 
in Patterson, the Court in Tovar rejected the Iowa Supreme Court 
two-pronged requirement: ―If [the defendant] . . . lacked a full and 
complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his 
waiver, it does not defeat the State‘s showing that the information 
provided to him satisfied the constitutional minimum.‖99  This obser-
vation, and the fact that the Court in Tovar believed that the Iowa Su-
preme Court overlooked the principle that an intelligent waiver ―de-
pend[s], in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case,‖100 cemented the reasoning for overturning the 
decision made by Iowa‘s highest court.101 
The decisions in Faretta and Tovar formed the basic founda-
tion for the issues in Crampe.  The Court in Faretta made a major 
finding that the right to self-representation was a constitutionally held 
right implicitly found in the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.102  The decision in Tovar is a bridge from the federal 
and constitutional issues of Faretta and Patterson to the state issues 
that are the main focus of the decision in Crampe. 
IV. NEW YORK STATE PERSPECTIVE: THE “SEARCHING 
INQUIRY”: WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY? 
Unlike the United States Constitution, the New York State 
 
97 Id. at 89-90; 487 U.S. 285 (1988). 
98 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298-300.  The Court in Patterson held that the warnings required 
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of 
his Fifth Amendment rights but of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Tovar, 541 U.S. at 
89.  The Court indicated that the Miranda warnings effectively expressed to the defendant 
that he has the right to counsel during questioning and of ―the ultimate adverse consequence 
of making uncounseled admissions.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court add-
ed that ―[t]he Miranda warnings . . . also sufficed . . . to let [the defendant] know what a 
lawyer could do for him, namely, advise him to refrain from making statements that could 
prove damaging to his defense.‖  Id. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 Id. at 92. 
100 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 
101 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90-91. 
102 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817. 
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Constitution codifies the right to self-representation in Article I, Sec-
tion VI.103  The question then, is what constitutes a ―searching in-
quiry?‖  In determining whether a waiver is valid ―the court should 
undertake a searching inquiry of the defendant.‖104  The ―searching 
inquiry‖ should consider a ―defendant‘s pedigree since such factors 
as age, level of education, occupation and previous exposure to the 
legal system may bear on a waiver‘s validity.‖105 
In Crampe, the court analyzed the ―searching inquiry‖ 
through the two seminal New York Court of Appeals cases: People v. 
McIntyre106 and People v. Arroyo.107  The court in these cases dis-
cussed the right of criminal defendants to waive their constitutional 
right to counsel and proceed pro se. 
A. McIntyre 
In McIntyre, the defendant was charged with robbery and 
murder in August 1966.108  Before the trial began, the defendant 
asked the judge if he would be permitted to try the case on his own.109  
The trial court began a colloquy, asking about the defendant‘s back-
ground.110  The trial judge asked the defendant if he believed that 
counsel was not competent to defend him.111  After a brief discussion 
with the judge about the defendant‘s lack of knowledge and skills re-
quired to conduct his own trial, the defendant had an outburst, which 
caused the judge to deny his request to represent himself.112  The case 
continued to trial and the jury convicted McIntyre of robbery and 
murder in the first degree.113  The Appellate Division affirmed, hold-
ing that the defendant‘s pro se motion was denied due to his ―inabili-
ty to maintain self-control.‖114 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, 
 
103 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
104 People v. Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 2002). 
105 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 773 (citing Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156). 
106 324 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1974). 
107 772 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 2002); Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 766-67. 




112 Id. at 324-25. 
113 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 325. 
114 Id. 
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holding that the trial court should not have denied the defendant‘s 
motion based on his outburst.115  A criminal defendant may choose to 
defend pro se if: ―(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, 
(2) there has been a knowing intelligent waiver of the right to coun-
sel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would 
prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues.‖116 
The trial court and the Appellate Division both relied on the 
fact that McIntyre‘s outburst was a violation of the third prong and, 
therefore, a proper denial of his right to self-representation was 
made.117  However, the Court of Appeals rejected that theory, stating 
that a denial could not be based on a party‘s outburst after receiving 
an unfavorable ruling.118  The court further said that even if the out-
burst was prior to the denial, the court could not provoke disruptive 
behavior from the defendant by ―conducting its inquiry in an abusive 
manner calculated to belittle a legitimate application.  An outburst 
thus provoked will not justify the forfeiture of the right of self-
representation.‖119  Finally, the court stated that the trial court did not 
conduct a proper inquiry to ―[elicit] the information which might 
have warranted a denial of the motion‖; therefore, a new trial should 
have been conducted.120 
McIntyre established the three factors that must be met in or-
der to invoke one‘s right to self-representation.121  These factors pro-
vide a framework for criminal defendants to follow in order to protect 
their right to defend pro se. 
B. Arroyo 
The defendant was convicted of second degree robbery and 
fourth degree grand larceny.122  During the trial, Arroyo made a re-
quest to continue pro se because of his dissatisfaction with his coun-
sel.123  The judge made little inquiry into the defendant‘s background, 
 
115 Id. at 328. 
116 Id. at 327. 
117 Id. at 325. 
118 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 328. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 327. 
122 Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1155. 
123 Id. 
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education, or occupational history, and was sufficiently convinced 
that Arroyo was capable of representing himself.124  He continued the 
case pro se, was convicted, and the Appellate Division affirmed.125 
The Court of Appeals held that the ―trial court failed to secure 
an effective waiver of counsel necessary to allow defendant to 
represent himself‖; therefore, the conviction was reversed and a new 
trial was ordered.126  The court explained that in order to represent 
oneself, ―a defendant must make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent 
waiver of the right to counsel.‖127  In determining whether a defen-
dant has properly made a waiver of his right to counsel, a court must 
make a ―searching inquiry‖ of the defendant.128  This inquiry should 
make the defendant ―aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation‖ and a record should be made that the ―trial court has 
delved into [the] defendant‘s age, education, occupation, previous 
exposure to legal procedures and other relevant factors bearing on a 
competent, intelligent, voluntary waiver.‖129  The court also pointed 
out that there is no formula to the inquiry but it ― ‗must accomplish 
the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks inherent in 
proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular impor-
tance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication.‘ ‖130  
The trial court in Arroyo failed to make any inquiry at all and, there-
fore, ―the court failed, at the outset, to evaluate adequately defen-
dant‘s competency to waive counsel, to warn him of the ‗risks inhe-
rent in proceeding pro se‘ and to apprise him of the ‗importance of 
the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication.‘ ‖131 
V. ANALYZING CRAMPE 
At first look the decision in Crampe does not seem to add any 
significant wrinkles to the issues involved in waiving the right to 




126 Id. at 1156. 
127 Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156 (citing People v. Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 
1991)). 
128 Id. (quoting Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d at 923). 
129 Id. (quoting People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1998)). 
130 Id. (quoting Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208). 
131 Id. (quoting Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208).  
15
Villani: What are we Searching For?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
1066 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
principles and procedures that have been discussed since Faretta.  
Criminal defendants have a qualified right to represent themselves 
and in order to invoke that right they must make a knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary waiver.
132
  Even the lengthy discussion about the 
―searching inquiry‖ is an aged issue.  One must look deep within the 
decision to invoke what it is really about and what it adds to this his-
toric concept. 
On the surface, Crampe is a basic case about an insufficient 
―searching inquiry.‖  The town justice made little effort to develop 
the information needed for a defendant to make a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver.  The standard form given to Crampe and read by the 
judge was nothing more than basic information that could have been 
ascertained by almost any layperson. 
The major aspect in Crampe is the actual colloquy itself.  The 
Court of Appeals sought to ensure that the ―searching inquiry‖ does 
not become some basic formality.  To waive one‘s constitutional 
rights is a major decision.  This decision is critical in a criminal de-
fendant‘s case and can dramatically affect the rest of his or her life.  
A judge plays a significant role in the inquiry.  He should convey the 
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se in a thorough discus-
sion with the defendant, not with simple form that cannot truly ex-
press the importance of the decision to be made.  A dialogue between 
the judge and the defendant is the only effective way to provide the 
important information needed to make a truly knowing and intelligent 
waiver of constitutional rights.  This seems to be the major principle 
that should be taken away from the decision. 
People v. Wingate is less simplistic than Crampe, but still 
embodies the same principle found in many previous cases.  ―The 
Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration 
the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process.‖133  
Because the right to counsel is guaranteed at every critical stage, the 
right to forego counsel is also available at every critical stage.  This is 
why the court decided that even though the trial judge made a suffi-
cient inquiry, his inquiry could not be used retrospectively in order to 
fix the error made by the suppression-hearing officer. 
In very basic terms, Wingate is based on the principles stated 
above, but if one would indulge in a deeper examination, it would re-
 
132 Adams, 317 U.S. at 275. 
133 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 80-81. 
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veal that the court had a larger goal in mind when deciding the case.  
The inclusion of the trial court‘s colloquy is particularly important.  
Historically, courts have said that there should be no formula to the 
searching inquiry and flexibility should be maintained.  But because 
of that very theory many cases with the same issues find their way 
back to the high courts.  The inclusion of the trial court colloquy 
should be viewed as the Court of Appeals‘ attempt to give a frame-
work to the ―searching inquiry.‖  Without saying that it is the only 
way to conduct a sufficient inquiry, the court gives a thorough exam-
ple of a model colloquy134: 
The opinion provided the following colloquy: 
     This judge first confirmed with defendant that he 
had turned down an offer of a minimum sentence of 1 
½ to 3 years; warned him that he faced a sentence of 
15 years to life if convicted and sentenced as a discre-
tionary persistent felon; and stressed that, ―based on 
[his] many years of experience,‖ it was his:  
     good faith belief that it is a mistake to represent 
yourself.  Areas of law can be complicated and a per-
son, not even another lawyer [should] engage in self-
representation.  So I strongly urge you to get a lawyer, 
and if you cannot afford one, a lawyer will be ap-
pointed for you.  That is my honest heartfelt belief.  
Because of the exposure that you may be facing in 
terms of incarceration, should you lose and the intrica-
cies involved in self-representation and legal matters, 
you should seriously get a lawyer to represent you.  
Do you understand that? 
     Defendant responded that he understood. 
     After reiterating that defendant ―could be facing a 
long time in jail, up to life,‖ the trial judge cautioned 
that it was ―a big mistake to go it alone.‖  The judge 
then asked defendant if he had any legal training, and 
defendant replied that he had been studying law for 
the last 10 or 12 years ―in the street and different libra-
ries‖ and was ―not a paralegal [but] just received legal 
 
134 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 259-62. 
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research certificates.‖  When the judge inquired if he 
was a college graduate, defendant responded that he 
held a two-year associate‘s degree in labor studies 
from Empire State College, and was ―a law librarian, 
library clerk in the facility‖ where he worked. 
     Again, the trial judge ―strongly urge[d]‖ defendant 
―with all the sincerity that [he could] muster that [de-
fendant] must‖ get a lawyer.  As the judge put it, ―I 
say that because obviously the decision is yours, but I 
use the term ‗must‘ get a lawyer.  You are facing too 
much in this case.  Once it‘s over, it‘s over.  So you 
should seriously consider that.‖  Before sending the 
case to the trial-ready part for disposition of defen-
dant‘s pro se speedy trial motion, the judge reiterated 
that defendant should think twice before representing 
himself: 
     THE COURT: You think about what I told you.  
This case may be disposed of.  You may be back here 
or not.  Whatever you do, you may seriously think 
about what I am telling you.  I can‘t tell you in [any] 
stronger terms[:] get a lawyer.  Don‘t play with this. 
     THE DEFENDANT: I requested an assistant. 
     THE COURT: Listen to me.  Get a lawyer.  Don‘t 
play with this.  You will end up in jail for the rest of 
your life and that‘s ridiculous. 
     THE DEFENDANT: I appreciate it. 
     THE COURT: You insist that a lawyer represent 
you. 
    After defendant‘s speedy trial motion was denied 
and his case was recalled for trial, the trial judge ―rei-
terate[d]‖ that he had ―indicated to [defendant] before 
the matter was referred back [to the trial-ready part] 
that [he] should seriously consider getting a lawyer.‖  
When the judge asked defendant whether he had 
―done that,‖ defendant replied ―Yes, I have considered 
it, your Honor.‖  He explained that ―the reason why I 
am persistent now is because I had attorneys.  I am 
going this by myself.  I appreciate what you said.  I 
asked for an attorney to assist me, but I am not going 
18
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to let them take control because that‘s why I am per-
sistent.‖  At that point, the judge said there was ―[n]o 
reason for any further explanation,‖ and appointed 
standby counsel to assist defendant, as he had re-
quested. 
     . . . The judge first looked into defendant‘s age and 
competency in English; he explored whether defen-
dant was taking or had ever taken medications that 
might compromise his understanding; he confirmed 
that defendant did not suffer from any mental or phys-
ical condition that might impair his ability to follow 
what was happening in court.  The judge inquired if 
defendant had been afforded ―sufficient time to reflect 
on [his] decision to represent [him]self.‖  When de-
fendant responded affirmatively, the judge asked ―And 
having reflected on this decision, you are now desir-
ous of continuing to represent yourself?‖  Defendant 
answered ―Yes.‖  
     The trial judge then reviewed defendant‘s school-
ing, work history and knowledge of the criminal jus-
tice system, eliciting that defendant had achieved an 
―A‖ average at Empire State College; had worked as 
an electrician, a cook, and a legal clerk; was not a 
stranger to the criminal justice system; had expe-
rienced some success representing himself in this case 
in the past; and had appeared in court with a lawyer, 
although he ultimately did not get along with either of 
his two assigned attorneys.  The judge followed up by 
establishing that defendant had never represented him-
self at trial, and examining whether he knew anything 
about the rules of evidence.  (He ultimately announced 
that he was ―convinced‖ that defendant knew next to 
nothing about this topic.)  The judge looked at whether 
defendant had been coerced or threatened or in any 
way influenced to request to represent himself. 
     The trial judge probed defendant‘s comprehension 
of the charges against him, the plea offer that had been 
made (and that he would have ―minimal time‖ left if 
he accepted it) and the length of the sentence he might 
19
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receive if convicted.  In response to the judge‘s ques-
tions, defendant claimed to understand his lawyers‘ 
explanations of court procedures and legal issues re-
lated to the charges.  When asked to explain to the 
judge exactly why he wished to waive his right to 
counsel, defendant asserted that, otherwise, he would 
not know about ―things . . . going on between [his at-
torney] and the DA,‖ wanted to ―eliminate the middle 
person‖ and believed he was ―better off just 
representing [him]self.‖ 
     The trial judge pursued whether defendant knew 
the functions of the court and the jury, and defendant 
answered that the ―jury would be the triers of the 
facts‖ and would decide the case ―based on the facts . . 
. presented . . . and the instructions.‖  When the judge 
called upon defendant to explain his role and the pros-
ecutor‘s role, defendant responded that the ―prosecu-
tor‘s role is . . . to seek justice not just convictions.  
Her duty is to present her case . . . and to do it fairly.  
My job is to protect, preserve the rights of myself . . . , 
and to present the same information or evidence that I 
have to contradict what is being stated by the wit-
nesses . . . that [the] prosecution presents.‖ 
     The trial judge observed to defendant that 
―[t]he law recognizes the right of a person to defend 
himself or herself.  However, the law also recognizes 
such a choice may not be a wise one.  Let me alert you 
now to some of the [dangers] of self-representation so 
that you will be aware of them before you finally de-
cide whether you wish to give up your right to be 
represented by a lawyer.  Please listen to me carefully.  
Even the most intelligent and educated layman has 
small and sometimes no skills in the field of law.  Left 
without the assistance of counsel, he or she may be put 
on trial without a proper charge and convicted upon 
incomplete[ ], irrelevant, or inadmissible evidence.  
Often the layman lacks the skill [or] knowledge to 
adequately prepare his or her defense, even though he 
may have a good one.  Without counsel, though an ac-
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 33
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/33
  
2012] WHAT ARE WE SEARCHING FOR? 1071 
cused may not be guilty, he faces the danger of con-
viction because he does not know how to adequately 
protect his legal rights.  Lawyers are both generally 
college and law school trained before they are permit-
ted to take the bar examination.  Only those who pass 
the bar are licensed to practice law.  The number who 
become trial lawyers [is] small.  In order to adequately 
represent a client, a trial lawyer needs a comprehen-
sive knowledge of the rules of evidence, which I be-
lieve you do not possess, as well as an understanding 
of the art of jury selection and the art of cross-
examination . . . [M]ost non-lawyers do not have such 
education and training.  Did you understand what I 
just said?‖ 
    Defendant answered ―Yes.‖ 
    The trial judge then asked defendant if he unders-
tood that almost all pro se representations are unsuc-
cessful; that by choosing to represent himself he was 
not entitled to a lawyer, although the judge would ap-
point a lawyer to ―sit next to [him] and give [him] le-
gal advice‖; that he would be held to the same legal 
standards as an attorney; that he would ―receive no 
advantage or assistance from [the] court‖ because 
―[e]ven in those cases where [he] show[ed] a lack of 
complete knowledge of how to represent [himself], 
[the court couldn‘t] jump in the middle‖ and help him 
out; that when defendant did ―something wrong,‖ the 
judge was going to ―call [him] on it‖ and he had to 
―live with that‖; that he risked not being able to under-
stand legal terms of art used in court proceedings, the 
―case names used and what they stand for‖ and poten-
tially applicable rules or theories of criminal law; that 
he would be subject to the same rules of evidence as 
an attorney and chanced not being able to introduce 
evidence because of his ignorance of these rules; that 
his examination of witnesses would be held to the 
same standards as those expected of an attorney; that 
he would have to make his own opening and closing 
statements to the jury; that the assistant district attor-
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ney presenting the case against him was trained in the 
law and was familiar with criminal law principles, and 
would not ―go ‗easy‘ on‖ him because he was 
representing himself; that by waiving his right to 
counsel he was giving up the ―benefit of [an] attor-
ney‘s ability, training, and past experiences in speak-
ing to a jury‖; and that he would be expected to ―con-
duct [himself] appropriately in the courtroom.‖  
Defendant indicated that he understood all of these 
things, and ―[w]ithout a doubt‖ still wished to 
represent himself. 
     The trial judge elaborated on his admonition to de-
fendant that ―self-representation [was] not a license to 
abuse‖ the courtroom‘s ―dignity and decorum,‖ cau-
tioning him that if he did not conduct himself properly 
he might lose his right to be present at trial.  Again, 
defendant said that he understood.  With that represen-
tation, the judge pronounced himself satisfied that he 
had asked defendant the ―relevant questions to deter-
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